

---

# ISSUES IN MARKET LIQUIDITY

## A RISK MANAGER'S VIEW

Stephen McCarthy

# GFC – A QUICK RECAP

---

Catalyst: USD Housing Crash

The over-Leveraged Financial sector experienced large losses

Negative Liquidity spiral occurred as


- Banks' balance sheets deteriorate i.e. Bad debts increase (Sub-Prime market)
- Banks' reduced RWAs, selling Assets
- Banks' risk management tighten, lending reduced, counterparty exposures minimized
- Trading/stock margins increase
- Liquidity vanishes, prices drop

Global Contagion E.g. through tranching securities (CDOs)

Extreme liquidity risk

- Extreme funding liquidity risk: banks may default
- Extreme market liquidity risk: dealers shutting down (no bids!)

# GLOBAL CONTAGION : MULTIPLIER EFFECTS



**Fig. 1** Initial subprime losses (almost invisible in the figure) and subsequent declines up to November 2008 in World GDP and World stock market capitalization (in Trillions US Dollars). Source: IMF Global Financial Stability Report; World Economic Outlook November update and estimates; World Federation of Exchanges. Reproduced from Blanchard (2008)

# GFC – A QUICK RECAP

---

Prudential Regulators' interpretation of the crisis

A lethal combination of:

1. Poor Liquidity Management
2. Inaccurately measured and mispriced Risk
3. Excessive Leverage

# LIQUIDITY CONTEXTS

---

Liquidity has many forms and can be described in a number of contexts.

System Liquidity

Structural Liquidity

Market Liquidity

Funding Liquidity

As a psychological concept

# SYSTEM/STRUCTURAL LIQUIDITY

The Banking System's Liquidity position is managed to ensure that the cash rate trades at the target set by the Reserve Bank Board and to facilitate the settlement of financial institutions' payment obligations

System Liquidity

End-of-day balances held by FIs in their Exchange Settlement (ES) accounts.

Structural Liquidity


Liquidity position that would exist in the absence of the RBA's domestic operations

Target Cash Rate  
OCR = 1.5%

ES > Demand => Cash ↓  
ES < Demand => Cash ↑

# REPURCHASE AGREEMENTS


A repurchase agreement, or repo for short, is a type of short-term loan much used in the money markets, whereby the seller of a security agrees to buy it back at a specified price and time. The seller pays an interest rate, called the repo rate, when buying back the securities.



# STRUCTURAL DEFICIT

**Graph 1**

**Structural Liquidity Position**




Source: RBA




# MARKET LIQUIDITY

Market Liquidity is essentially the ability to trade with minimum cost and time and for which there are ready and willing counterparties. i.e., the ease with which it is traded




# BOND EXCHANGE TRADED FUNDS

Bond ETFs are traded on many of the large exchanges.  
The NTA of the ETF is based on the value of the underlying physical portfolio of bonds.



# FUNDING LIQUIDITY

Funding Liquidity is essentially the ability to settle financial obligations accurately and timely. i.e., the ease with which funding can be obtained



# LIQUIDITY – A PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPT?

“Liquidity is a psychological concept not a monetary or financial concept.”  
Robert E Rubin. 70th United States Secretary of the Treasury. 2009


2009: US Labour Secretary Robert Reich “fundamental problem isn’t lack of capital. It’s lack of trust.”

2009: Nobel economist Joseph Stiglitz “present financial crisis springs from a catastrophic collapse in confidence”

Argentina, 2001

The 2017 Edelman Trust Barometer reveals that trust is in crisis around the world. The general population’s trust in all four key institutions — business, government, NGOs, and media — has declined broadly, a phenomenon not reported since Edelman began tracking trust among this segment in 2012.

# LIQUIDITY SPIRAL



Sources: Garleanu and Pedersen (2007) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008)

# LIQUIDITY TRAP PRE-2008

*Liquidity Trap is a scenario in which the central bank adds money into the market with the goal of stimulating the economy, but fails to lower the long term interest rates.*


*In times of recession, an economy can be faced with the problem of short-term interest rates reaching or nearing zero. This makes the monetary policy ineffective, and an external catalyst is besought to stimulate the economy.*

*The central bank does so by purchasing financial assets of longer maturity from commercial banks with the intent of lowering the long-term interest rate.*

*A liquidity trap takes place when these actions fail to lower the long-term interest rate.*


SOURCE: <http://macroeconomicanalysis.com/macroeconomics-wikipedia/liquidity-trap/>

# NEGATIVE NOMINAL INTEREST RATES



# ECB VIEW

## How much lower can we go?\*




\*Note: The chart is for illustrative purposes. As discussed in the text, the economic lower bound can be, under certain circumstances, above zero or below the physical lower bound. 7

[www.ecb.europa.eu](http://www.ecb.europa.eu) ©




# QUANTITATIVE EASING – A CENTRAL BANK'S VIEW

Figure 2 Stylised transmission mechanism for asset purchases



Source: BOE Quarterly Bulletin 2009

# CENTRAL BANK DEBT ACCUMULATION - USA



# CORPORATE DEFAULT LEVELS


Table 1

## Global Corporate Default Summary (cont.)

	Total defaults*	Investment-grade defaults	Speculative-grade defaults	Default rate (%)	Investment-grade default rate (%)	Speculative-grade default rate (%)	Total debt outstanding (Bil. \$)
2000	136	7	109	2.48	0.24	6.23	43.28
2001	229	7	173	3.78	0.23	9.87	118.79
2002	226	13	159	3.59	0.42	9.49	190.92
2003	119	3	89	1.92	0.10	5.06	62.89
2004	56	1	38	0.78	0.03	2.02	20.66
2005	40	1	31	0.60	0.03	1.50	42.00
2006	30	0	26	0.48	0.00	1.18	7.13
2007	24	0	21	0.37	0.00	0.91	8.15
2008	127	14	89	1.80	0.42	3.69	429.63
2009	268	11	224	4.18	0.33	9.89	627.70
2010	83	0	64	1.20	0.00	3.00	97.48
2011	53	1	44	0.80	0.03	1.83	84.30
2012	83	0	66	1.14	0.00	2.57	86.70
2013	81	0	64	1.06	0.00	2.29	97.29
2014	60	0	45	0.69	0.00	1.43	91.55
2015	113	0	94	1.36	0.00	2.75	110.31
2016	162	0	143	2.06	0.00	4.19	239.79

\* This column includes companies that were no longer rated one year prior to default. Sources: S&P Global Fixed Income Research and S&P Credit Pro®.

# UNTRADABLE DEBT



Source : Grant Williams “Things that make you go hmmm...”


# RELATIVE RISK

Chart 2: European HY yields now below 2%




Source: ICE BofAML Global Bond Indices, HE00 and G0Q0 (yield to worst).

# QUANTITATIVE TIGHTENING




Source: Michael Lebowitz of 720 Global.

# CENTRAL BANK DEBT ACCUMULATION – EUR, JPY



Source: Haver Analytics


# CASH HOLDINGS ARE SHRINKING



Both money market and mutual fund cash levels are at an all-time low.



# EVEN LARGE INVESTORS



Institutional investors were holding the least cash since at least December 2008 back in June, which was and has continued to be a sign that confidence is overheating.

# REGULATORY MANAGEMENT OF BANKS

Since 2009, the BIS has issued a number of different policy announcements and decrees

## BASEL Initiatives

- Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision (2008)
- Central Clearing Counterparties: G20 Leaders, Pittsburgh Summit (2009)
- Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools (2013)
  - LCR – US vs EU, BOE stance
- Basel III leverage ratio framework and disclosure requirements (2014)
  - Leverage ratio – US preference as not risk weighted
- Basel III: The Net Stable Funding Ratio (2014)

## Australian Tactical Responses


- RBA “open” window
- Committed Lending Facility – Each Bank must have minimum a \$4bn deposit
- AUD Banks can access up to \$50-\$60bn if needed (Cost 15bp)
- Unencumbered Securities only can be used for Repurchase Agreements with the RBA.

# CENTRAL CLEARING HOUSES


## Exposures network and CCP waterfall

Graph 1

From non-centrally cleared to centrally cleared exposures




Waterfall of resources in the event of a CCP participant's inability to meet trading obligations



© Bank for International Settlements

# CENTRAL CLEARING HOUSES

To reduce the systemic risks resulting from bilateral trading, the G20 Leaders agreed at the 2009 Pittsburgh Summit that all standardised derivatives contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platforms and cleared through central counterparties (CCPs).



Source: Bank for International Settlements

# LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO (LCR)

$$\text{LCR} = \frac{\text{High Quality Liquid Assets}}{\text{Total Net Cash Outflows over 30 days}} > 100\%$$

## HQLA (High Quality Liquid Assets)

### LEVEL 1

No Haircut required.  
Liquid assets including Cash, Sovereign Bonds and Central Bank reserves

### LEVEL 2 (≤ 40% of Total HQLA)

#### LEVEL 2A

15% Haircut required  
Includes certain Sovereign bonds, Covered or Corporate bonds.

#### LEVEL 2B

≤ 15% of Total HQLA

Subject to 25% - 50% Haircut.  
Includes low rated Corporate bonds, RMBS and some equities

Net Cash Outflows = Cash Outflows – Cash inflows in a stressed scenario for 30 days

The LCR metric aims to ensure that “a financial institution maintains an adequate level of unencumbered high quality assets which are sufficient to cover outflows in a defined survival period, 30 days, under acute short term stress scenarios”

**This is purely a  
REGULATORY view of  
safety.**

# NET STABLE FUNDING RATIO (NSFR)

$$\text{NSFR} = \frac{\text{Available amount of Stable Funding}}{\text{Required amount of Stable Funding}} > 100\%$$

NSFR  
(High Quality Liquid Assets)

Available amount of Stable  
Funding

Includes Customer Deposits, long term  
wholesale funding and Equity  
DOES NOT include hot money eg short term  
wholesale funding

Required amount of Stable  
Funding

Includes NET assets required to be funded.

The NSFR metric aims to ensure that “long term assets are funded by long term stable funding”

The objective is to:

1. Promote resilience of bank’s liquidity profile
2. Encourage a sustainable maturity structure
3. Incent banks to fund with stable sources of funding.

# LEVERAGE RATIO (LR)

$$\text{LR} = \frac{\text{Capital Measure}}{\text{Exposure Measure}} > 4\%$$

LR  
(a non-risk weighted Ratio)

Capital Measure

Tier 1 Capital comprising  
Common Equity Tier 1 and/or Additional  
Tier 1 instruments

Exposure Method

Accounting based value of:


- On- Balance sheet positions,
- Securities financing
- Off-balance sheet items.

No netting is allowed

The *Leverage Ratio* is a non-risk-based measure of a bank's Tier 1 capital relative to its total exposures, and is intended to be a backstop to the risk-based capital requirements.

“US view - The concern, in some instances, is that the risk-weighted approach may lead to insufficient levels of capital.”

# COMBINED IMPACT OF LCR, NSFR AND LR



**FIGURE 12.1** Illustrative Relative Ranges for LCR and NSFR Levels for Different Business Models  
Source: PwC analysis



# Disclaimer

---

This document has been prepared for information purposes and does not constitute financial product advice. The information does not constitute, in any jurisdiction, a recommendation, invitation, offer, or solicitation or inducement to buy or sell any financial instrument or product, or to engage in or refrain from engaging in any transaction.

It is not the intention of NAB to create legal relations on the basis of the information contained herein.

So far as the law allows, neither NAB nor its related bodies corporate or any of their officers, employees, agents, advisers or contractors (collectively, “NAB Parties”) warrants or represents that the information in this document is accurate, reliable, complete or contemporary.

To the extent permitted by law, the NAB Parties shall not be liable for any loss or damage which may be suffered by any person relying upon this document or any Information (including by way of negligence or misrepresentation) arising from or in connection with information contained in this document.

## Disclaimer of liability

To the maximum extent permitted by law, the NAB Parties expressly disclaims all or any liability arising from or in connection with:

- the contents of or omissions from the Materials, including any express or implied representations, statements, conclusions and forward-looking statements;
- the provision to or use by any person of the information and statements contained in the Materials;
- the preparation of the information contained in the Materials; and
- any loss, damage, costs or expenses of any nature which may be suffered or incurred by any person relying on, disclosing or using any information or statement contained in or connected with the Materials.

No member of the NAB Parties has any liability to the Recipient or to any of such Recipient’s officers, directors, employees, agents or associates, legal counsel or other professional advisers or to any other person for any damages, claims, costs or losses resulting from the use of the information contained in the Materials.

## Accuracy of materials from third party sources

The Materials contain information received from third party sources and the content of that information was not devised, nor has it been verified or tested, by any member of the NAB Parties. No member of the NAB Parties takes any responsibility for that information or endorses its accuracy.

## Governing law

The Materials are governed by, and are to be construed in accordance with, the laws in force in the State of Victoria, Australia, and any dispute or claim arising from, or in connection with, the Materials is subject to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of that State.

# THANK YOU

---



Source: NY Times Magazine

# REFERENCES - BASLE III PAPERS

---

**Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools;**

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2013

<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf>

**Basel III: the net stable funding ratio**

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (October 2014)

<https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d295.pdf>

**Basel III leverage ratio framework and disclosure requirements;**

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2014

<https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs270.pdf>

**Basel III: Finalising post -crisis reforms**

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, December 2017

<https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.pdf>

# REFERENCES – LIQUIDITY ARTICLES

---

## **Liquidity Risk Management: A Practitioner's Perspective**

Venkat, S. and Baird, S. (2016)

<https://books.google.com.au/books?isbn=1118918797>

## **Identifying Liquidity risk**

Quantifi Whitepaper

[www.quantifysolutions.com](http://www.quantifysolutions.com)

## **Market Liquidity and Funding Liquidity;**

Markus K. Brunnermeier, Lasse Heje Pedersen

<https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article-abstract/22/6/2201/1592184>

## **2017 Edelman Trust Barometer**

<https://www.edelman.com/trust2017/>

# REFERENCES – LIQUIDITY AND CONFIDENCE

---

## **Trust, Confidence and Economic Crisis**

Fran Tonkiss, Intereconomics, July/August 2009

<https://archive.intereconomics.eu/downloads/getfile.php?id=690>

## **Financial Bubbles, Real Estate bubbles, Derivative Bubbles, and the Financial and Economic Crisis**

arXiv:0905.0220v1 [q-fin.RM] 2 May 2009

Didier Sornette and Ryan Woodard

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/0905.0220.pdf>

## **Argentina's 2001 economic and Financial Crisis: Lessons for Europe**

Miguel Kiguel, November 2016

[https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/11\\_argentina\\_kiguel.pdf](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/11_argentina_kiguel.pdf)

## **Lessons from the Crisis in Argentina**

IMF, 2003

<https://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/lessons/100803.pdf>

# REFERENCES – CENTRAL BANKS

---

## **Structural Liquidity and Domestic Market Operations**

Benn Robertson, RBA Domestic Market Operations, September 2017

<http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2017/sep/pdf/bu-0917-5-structural-liquidity-and-domestic-market-operations.pdf>

## **RBA Quarterly Bulletin**

<https://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2017/sep/>

## **Central clearing: trends and current issues**

Dietrich Domanski, Leonardo Gambacorta and Cristina Picillo

BIS Quarterly Review, December 2015

[https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r\\_qt1512g.htm](https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1512g.htm)

# REFERENCES – RISK MAGAZINE ARTICLES

---

**Scrap the gold plate: Mnuchin goes global**

Risk.net – July 2017

# REFERENCES – DEBT ARTICLES

---

## **Worldwide debt more than triple economic output as central bank shift looms**

Marc Jones, Reuters

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-debt-iif/worldwide-debt-more-than-triple-economic-output-as-central-bank-shift-looms-idUSKBN1CU1V9>



# REFERENCES – QUANTITATIVE EASING

---

## **The Liquidity Trap: An Alternative Explanation for Today's Low Inflation**

Maria A. Arias , Yi Wen (2014)

<https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/april-2014/the-liquidity-trap-an-alternative-explanation-for-todays-low-inflation>

## **Quantitative easing**

BOE Quarterly Bulletin 2009 Q2

<https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/quarterly-bulletin/2009/quantitative-easing.pdf>

# REFERENCES – NEGATIVE RATES

---

## **Assessing the implications of negative interest rates**

European Central Bank

[https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2016/html/sp160728\\_slides.en.pdf](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2016/html/sp160728_slides.en.pdf)

## **What is a 'Negative Interest Rate Policy (NIRP)'**

Investopedia

<https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/negative-interest-rate-policy-nirp.asp>

## **Stimulating investment to rebalance the economy**

New Economics foundation, July 2013

<http://neweconomics.org/2013/07/strategic-quantitative-easing/>

## **Ultra-Low or Negative rate – what they mean for financial stability and growth.**

Herve Hannoun, Deputy General Manager

Bank for International Settlements, April 2015

# REFERENCES – LEVERAGE RATIO

---

## **The Leverage Ratio**

Univ.-Prof. Dr. Thomas Hartmann, Wendels Institute for Banking Management and Banking Law,  
University of Cologne

[https://die-dk.de/media/files/Jan\\_2016\\_en\\_komplett\\_final\\_korr\\_002.pdf](https://die-dk.de/media/files/Jan_2016_en_komplett_final_korr_002.pdf)

## **Liquidity Risk Management: A Practitioner's Perspective**

By Shyam Venkat, Stephen Baird

# REFERENCES – DEFAULT RATES

---

## **U.S. Department of Education Releases National Student Loan FY 2014 Cohort Default Rate**

US Department of Education, September 2017

<https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-releases-national-student-loan-fy-2014-cohort-default-rate>

## **2016 Annual Global Corporate Default - Study And Rating Transitions**

S&P global Ratings

<https://www.spratings.com/documents/20184/774196/2016+Annual+Global+Corporate+Default+Study+And+Rating+Transitions.pdf/2ddcf9dd-3b82-4151-9dab-8e3fc70a7035>