

# MANAGING CONDUCT IN WEALTH MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE INSIGHTS - ACTUARIES MANAGING RISK

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Section 1

What is conduct risk and how are these issues evolving over time?

Conduct risk has recently emerged as a very broad concept encompassing all kinds of financial firm wrong-doing



*Conduct risk is any action of an individual [firm] or the [financial] industry that leads to customer detriment or negatively impacts market stability.*



– FSA conduct risk definition (Philip Cooper, 2012)

# Typical conduct risk issues within the wealth and insurance space relate to product suitability, costs and performance

## Typical conduct risk taxonomy

Risk	Sub-risks	Description	Example issues
<b>Suitability</b>	<b>Suitability</b>	Customer is sold an unsuitable product	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Oversight/management of advisers</li> <li>• Ability to evidence customer needs and ascertain eligibility</li> <li>• Cross coverage sales (e.g. mobile phone insurance, travel insurance etc.)</li> </ul>
	<b>Understanding</b>	Customer is sold a product he/she does not fully understand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Product complexity and (evidencing of) customer understanding</li> <li>• Bundling (e.g. with banking products)</li> <li>• Lack of clarity on cover, claims handling etc.</li> </ul>
<b>Premiums and fees</b>	<b>Fair value exchange</b>	Firm is unable to justify the premiums and/or fees charged	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pricing and ability to evidence a fair value exchange (e.g. for small ticket P&amp;C products with low claims rates)</li> </ul>
<b>Product/performance</b>	<b>Terms and conditions</b>	Product sold does not match T&Cs description	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Various issues around renewal restrictions (e.g. pet insurance)</li> <li>• Use of potentially misleading investment jargon (“defensive”, “balanced”, “absolute return” etc.)</li> </ul>
	<b>Performance</b>	Product performance is leading to financial detriment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Losses in financial investments</li> </ul>

# Poor conduct leads to the deterioration of relationships, subpar returns, and increased regulatory burden on institutions

## Impact of poor conduct

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### Relationships

- Increased importance of long-term relationships given new advice models and challenged product economics
- Reputation, trust and loyalty among customers can take decades to develop, but moments to destroy

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### Returns

- Significant fines/legal costs
- Dealing with regulatory investigations, litigation, and remediation diverts management attention from value creation

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### Regulation


- Increasingly restrictive and intrusive regulatory standards imposed in response to misconduct incidents
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Conduct risk has emerged as a material source of value destruction


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# A number of significant conduct issues have emerged in the wealth and broader financial services space in Australia in recent years



# There is a need for increased oversight and communication to ensure positive customer and market outcomes

## Expected evolution



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It is increasingly important for the industry to join the debate on conduct regulation

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Section 2

How are regulators reacting to  
conduct risk?

# Regulatory oversight of conduct is evolving rapidly across many jurisdictions, with international practice converging on 4 key elements

## Four key elements of regulatory practice

Key element	Details
1 <b>Principles-based approach</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Increasing emphasis on principles-based approach to complement specific rules</li><li>• Specific emphasis on:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– Culture</li><li>– Incentives</li><li>– Internal governance and accountability mechanisms at Board, Executive and Compliance level (with 3 lines of defence model)</li></ul></li></ul>
2 <b>Focus areas</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Specific focus areas are emerging<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– Across jurisdictions specific themes are emerging: client suitability, customer affordability, new product approval processes, customer complaints handling</li><li>– Specific hotspots based on individual markets</li></ul></li></ul>
3 <b>Soft enforcement</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Shift to preventative “soft enforcement” to complement mainstream enforcement mechanisms</li></ul>
4 <b>Resourcing</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Scaling-up of resource requirements by regulators to deliver on:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– More ambitious supervisory agenda</li><li>– Improved organisational effectiveness</li><li>– Higher fines</li></ul></li></ul>

# Regulators are responding to misconduct mainly through stricter regulations, heavier penalties and increased surveillance

## Typical types of regulatory responses to misconduct to date

### Conduct regulations

- Stricter conduct regulations, including:
  - Requirements around improved customer communication
  - Restrictions on product design and pricing
  - Focus on “fair exchange of value”

### Misconduct penalties

- Heavier misconduct penalties, including:
  - Increased maximum jail term and fines for market misconduct

### Regulatory surveillance

- Increased regulatory surveillance, including:
  - Increased investigative powers
  - Greater resources to enhance conduct supervision (e.g. corporate regulation taskforce)

# ASIC has identified conduct as one of four key risks for focus in the recent strategic outlook report

## Key risks



## Key areas of focus

	Detect	Respond
<b>Gatekeeper conduct in financial services</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Proactive risk-based surveillance, targeting</b><ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– Financial advice firms</li><li>– Responsible entities operating managed investment schemes</li></ul></li><li>• <b>Assess all breach reports</b> and reports 'of misconduct</li><li>• <b>Gather hedge fund data</b></li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Take enforcement action</b>, accept enforceable undertakings and issue infringement notices, where appropriate</li><li>• <b>Provide guidance</b> on how the law will be administered</li></ul>

Source: ASIC

# A targeted surveillance of life insurance advice conducted by ASIC has identified a range of factors affecting quality of advice


## Key factors affecting life insurance advice

- Adviser incentives
- Inappropriate scaling of advice
- Lack of strategic life insurance advice
- Weak rationales for product replacement advice
- Failure to consider the relationship between life insurance and superannuation

## Warning signs of poor advice

- High clawback rates
- High volumes of replacement product advice, product bundling and upselling

## Advice rating by commission structure



Insurers should work with advisers to address any signs of such factors

Source: ASIC

Section 3


What more can firms do to manage  
conduct risk?

# There are four key emerging risks that are not yet being fully addressed across the industry

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- |   |                                  |   |
|---|----------------------------------|---|
| 1 | <b>Outcomes</b>                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Following the rules not enough – focus is on whether customers getting good outcomes not insurers' processes</li><li>• Defence that “we did nothing wrong because we followed the rules” of little consequence if outcome for customers poor</li></ul>  |
| 2 | <b>Value for money</b>           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Uber-transparency means products under public and regulatory scrutiny to prove value for money</li><li>• Relying on price disclosure not enough if insufficient benefit underpinning the value or usefulness of the product</li></ul>   |
| 3 | <b>Equality</b>                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• More pressure expected from legislators demanding elimination of certain customer groups being disadvantaged</li><li>• From public policy perspective, pricing making insurance more expensive (or unaffordable) for some customer groups unattractive</li><li>• More attention will extend to price discrimination between shoppers and non-shoppers or between new and existing customers</li></ul> |
| 4 | <b>Limits on the use of data</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Insurers need to be sure are happy to defend – in public - their sources and usage of personal data</li><li>• As amount of personal data being stored grows, regulators more vigilant, and less tolerant, of errors or lapses in capture and control of customers' data</li></ul>   |
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# A strong tone from the top, effective diagnostic techniques and proper alignment of business models are key to managing conduct risk

## Five elements of a comprehensive conduct risk management strategy





Best practice conduct risk management comprises a range of actions

**Conduct list – insurance industry “to do” list**

 <b>Strategy development</b>	 <b>Suitability</b>
 <b>Risk diagnostic</b>	 <b>3<sup>rd</sup> party relationships</b>
 <b>Risk appetite</b>	 <b>Cultural change</b>
 <b>Incentives design</b>	 <b>Operating model</b>
 <b>Performance management</b>	 <b>MI development</b>
 <b>Complaints management</b>	

Areas where insurers typically require most work

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